A study of SNMP developments regarding to security and performance by Oliveira, Diogo Nunes de et al.
A Study of SNMP Developments Regarding to Security and 
Performance 
 
Diogo Nunes de Oliveira, Sérgio Granato de Araújo, Getúlio Antero de Deus Júnior, 
Marcelo Stehling de Castro, Thiago Lara Vasques, Adriano Bittar 
Escola de Engenharia Elétrica e de Computação (EEEC), Universidade Federal de Goiás (UFG), 
Goiânia – GO, 74000-000, Brasil 
diogo.dno@gmail.com, getulio@eeec.ufg.br, granato@eeec.ufg.br, mcastro@eeec.ufg.br, 
thiago_lv@hotmail.com, adrianobittar@gmail.com 
 
Aderbal Alves Borges 
Innovation Consulting (InnovaCon), Goiânia – GO, 74000-000, Brasil 
aborges.consulting@gmail.com 
 
Roberto Ibrahim Brihi Badur 
BLM Inovações Tecnológicas, Goiânia – GO, 74000-000, Brasil, rbadur@gmail.com 
 
Abstract 
Telecommunication network availability is essential for all companies because their income is 
directly related to it. Because of this fact, network management systems also became essential, but 
the importance of managed information is faced by most network administrators as useless to 
others, therefore securing the management data is not considered. The main goal of this article is to 
show the importance of network management data and stimulate the use of security in network 
management systems. The good performance of network management systems are also important, 
therefore some tests are performed to verify how intensively the network and network manager 
performance can be injured by the use of cryptography algorithms and specially by the AES 
cryptographic standard in order to study the viability of the SNMPv3 with AES set. These tests are 
taken as a preview of a Broadband Power Line Network Management pilot project that is being 
implemented in the main electrical power transmission company in Goiás, Brazil. 
Keywords: Cryptography, Network Management, PLC, BPL, SNMP. 
 
Resumen 
La disponibilidad de la red de telecomunicaciones es esencial para todas las empresas porque sus 
ingresos están directamente relacionados con él. Así, los sistemas de gestión de red también se 
convirtieran en esencial. Sin embargo la importancia dada a la gestión de información por la 
mayoría de los administradores de red, los demás la consideran como inútil. Por lo tanto, la garantía 
de la gestión de datos no es levada en cuenta. El principal objetivo de este artículo es mostrar la 
importancia de la gestión de la red de datos y estimular el uso de la seguridad en los sistemas de 
gestión de red. El buen desempeño de los sistemas de gestión de red es también importante. Por lo 
tanto, algunas pruebas se realizan para verificar con qué intensidad lo rendimiento de los sistemas 
de gestión y de la red puede verse perjudicado por el uso de la criptografía y algoritmos, 
especialmente por el estándar cifrado AES, a fin de estudiar la viabilidad de lo conjunto SNMPv3 
con AES. Estas pruebas se toman como una vista previa de una banda ancha de lo proyecto piloto 
Power Line Network Management (que traducido al español vendría a ser Gestión de la 
Comunicación por la Red Eléctrica) que se llevará a cabo en la principal empresa de transmisión de 
la red eléctrica en Goiás, Brasil. 
Palabras-clave: Criptografía, Gestión de Redes, PLC, BPL, SNMP. 
1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
 
There are a lot access technologies competing each other such as ADSL, PLC/BPL and 
wireless trying to deliver the best data transmission services to companies and end users, but 
companies depend more on the quality of these services because most of them, if not all, have their 
profit directly related to email, company-to-company integrated systems, e-commerce and so on. 
To avoid unexpected and injurious situations, such as network devices downtime disabling 
Internet access or e-commerce web servers, a Network Management System (NMS) is indicated. A 
NMS permits a better network control such as detection of network traffic and overload, network 
device outage and security breaches. This control generates the possibility to take decisions before 
network problems come forward. 
A NMS depends on the Network Management Protocol. In Section 2 the IP-based network 
management protocol named Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is presented. The 
SNMP is a management protocol with three different useful versions: v1, v2c and v3. This article 
presents the basic differences between the SNMPv2c and SNMPv3 versions. 
It is important to understand how a cryptographic algorithm works, specially Data 
Encryption Standard (DES) and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) because these are the 
algorithms implemented in SNMPv3 and the objects of the tests performed, and this is the subject in 
Section 3. 
To ease the network management tasks some Network Management softwares are available. 
The softwares used in the tests are presented in Section 4. Some free softwares are used to perform 
the network monitoring, requiring just a few configurations or scripts developments. 
In Section 5 the article proposal is presented. Some performance tests are realized in order to 
bring up viability and security combination of SNMPv2c and several SNMPv3 possible 
implementations. Section 6 concludes this work. 
This article was mainly motivated by a pilot project of Broadband Power Line (BPL) 
Network Management System that is being implemented in an electrical power transmission 
company in Brazil, in the state of Goiás. The BPL technology is calling attention as a new 
Broadband access solution especially for regions that are hardly reached by other technologies. A 
great number of companies implement network management systems without any security care. It is 
critical to understand that management data are not only important to the network manager, but also 
for possible attackers, which is the reason for implementing security and keeping management data 
confidential. Another motivation is some comparison tests taken in [1] between SNMPv2c and 
SNMPv3 before the SNMPv3 AES support. 
 
2 THE SIMPLE NETWORK MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL AND ITS 
VERSIONS 
 
A Network Management System is a set composed of Network Manager, Network Agents 
and Network Management Protocol. The Network Manager is a host target to collect or receive 
information from managed devices. The Network Agents are softwares implemented in the network 
devices that are intended to be managed and the Network Management Protocol is the protocol used 
to exchange information among managers and agents. 
The two most well known and used management protocols are the OSI-based CMIP 
protocol and the TCP/IP-based SNMP [2] protocol. The Simple Network Management Protocol 
(SNMP) is a protocol used to manage IP-based network devices using a management database 
called MIB (Management Information Base) and by means of four basic SNMP operations [3]. Get 
is the operation where the manager queries the agent for specific information such as when it was 
booted for the last time or how many erroneous packets were received. Set is executed when the 
manager wants do modify specific information in the agent. Not all information can be altered by 
Set operation. Trap is an asynchronous operation performed by the agents. It can be configured to 
send information to the manager in a specified time slot. The fourth operation is Inform (not 
implemented in SNMPv1, therefore this version does not support distributed management). It 
enables the manager-to-manager communication when distributed management is used. Each 
device can have unique objects/attributes because some information are specific to some kinds of 
devices. For instance, BPL devices probably have attributes in their MIBs related to Signal-Noise 
relation, which is not present in hosts MIBs. 
SNMP Get, Set and Trap operations are implemented in all versions of SNMP (v1 [2], v2c 
[4] and v3 [5]) and Inform is implemented in versions v2c and v3. The main difference between 
SNMPv2c and SNMPv3 is the security issue, which is pretty slim in SNMPv2c. 
SNMPv2c security is based on community authentication. Before the SNMP operations are 
executed using SNMPv2c the community authentication is required. This authentication is based on 
a pre-established string that is transmitted in plain text. As example, if the manager wants to 
perform a Get operation on a specific network router it must inform the community string as an 
authentication string. If that string is correct, then the agent answers the Get operation. This security 
method is a critical security breach because with a simple packet sniffer (software to capture data 
being transmitted over the bus) someone can discover the community name and perform operations. 
A lot of network administrators consider monitoring data useless to others. On the other 
hand SNMP data can be most valuable for attackers. Using SNMP it is possible to discover the 
router of routing tables, which helps the attacker to map the whole network architecture, and, 
depending on the router’s MIB configuration it is also possible to change the routing tables. Some 
attacks are based on the network device’s uptime, information that can also obtained using SNMP. 
A lot of important information can be obtained or altered via SNMP, therefore it must be noticed 
that securing management data is indispensable. 
The SNMPv3 brings real security implementation. It has a User Security Model (USM) [6] 
responsible for realizing authentication and data encryption. The authentication is performed by 
checking username and password. The informed password is hashed. There are two possible 
hashing algorithms: HMAC-MD5-96 and HMAC-SHA-96. Data encryption can be performed to 
prevent transmitted data to be captured in simple text, as it happens in SNMPv2c. DES and AES are 
the two possible encryption standards. These cryptographic algorithms are presented in Section 4. 
There are three possible configurations for SNMPv3 involving security. noAuthNoPriv 
avoids authentication and encryption. authNoPriv obligates the authentication process but dismiss 
the encryption process, and authPriv forces the authentication and encryption process, which is the 
most secure method. 
The SNMPv3 with AES support was standardized in RFC 3826 in 2004 [7] and since it is a 
relatively new Internet standard it is not commonly implemented in managed devices. Most network 
devices with SNMPv3 only support DES as privacy protocol. 
 
3 PRIVACY ALGORITHMS 
 
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) became an encryption standard in 1977. It was 
developed by IBM based on an algorithm called Lucifer [8]. 
DES receives a 64-length bitstring plaintext and uses a 56-length bitstring cryptographic 
key. It generates a 64-length bit string ciphertext. Basically, DES is based on permutation tables and 
exclusive-OR operations. If the input plaintext is bigger than eight bytes (sixty four bits), this 
bitstring is segmented on blocks of eight bytes ciphering each block at a time. 
The permutation tables are used to swap the plaintext and key bitstring values. DES executes 
sixteen rounds of permutation and XOR operations, and after these rounds it executes one last 
permutation, obtaining the ciphertext bitstring. The only arithmetic operation performed by DES is 
the XOR operation (this operation is executed in all sixteen rounds), which proves it great 
performance. 
 Four modes of operation have been developed for DES. Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB), 
Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB), Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC) and Output Feedback Mode 
(OFB). The SNMPv3 DES implements the CBC mode. CBC mode uses an Initialization Vector IV 
(y0=vector IV) and xor it with the first input plaintext (y1=y0 ⊕ x1) before initiating the regular DES 
encryption method. Then, for the next plaintext bitstrings to be ciphered the previous ciphered text 
is used in the xor operation (yi=yi-1 ⊕ xi) [8], where y0 means the initialization vector IV, y1 is the 
first x-ored bitstring used as input for the first DES ciphering operation, x1 is the first plaintext 
bitstring to be ciphered, yi is the ith x-ored input bitstring and xi is the ith plaintext bitstring. The 
last 64 bits from the secret key are used as the Initialization Vector. 
 Although SNMPv3 DES in CBC mode generates a dynamic security architecture due to the 
use of previous ciphered text and some SNMPv3 dynamic header fields (EngineID and 
snmpGroupID header fields are used to generate the private key, therefore they are used to generate 
the Initialization Vector [6]), it is still a cipher algorithm that uses a 56-bits key. The use of 56-bits 
key cipher algorithm means that there are 256 possible ciphertexts for a specific plaintext. Due to 
DES short key length a lot of brute force attacks have been made against this algorithm and with the 
constant and exponential hardware development attacks began to come up with fast cracking 
results. According to [9], if is assumed that a cracker can perform one million decryptions per ms, a 
DES code would take about 10 hours to crack while a 128 bits code, such as Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) would take 1018 years (2128 possible combinations). 
 Because of the DES short key length issue, in 1997 NIST [10] (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology) called for proposals for a new encryption standard named Advanced 
Encryption Standard [11], which should have 128-bits block length and support 128, 192 and 256- 
bits keys lengths. The chosen algorithm was Rijndael [10]. 
 In AES, the 128 bit plaintext is arranged as a square matrix of bytes. 128 bits equals 16 
bytes, which is arranged as a matrix of 4x4. This matrix arrangement is copied into the so called 
State array, which is modified at each stage of encryption or decryption. 
 The key that is provided as input is expanded into an array of forty four 32-bit words. Four 
distinct words are used as round key for each round. Ten rounds are performed using substitution 
tables, permutation tables and xor arithmetic operation. After the last round, a 128-bit length 
ciphertext is generated. 
 The SNMPv3 AES mode is CFB. The difference between CFB and CBC (used by DES) is 
that before x-oring the plaintext bitstring with the previous ciphertext bitstring as performed in 
CBC, the previous ciphertext block is encrypted, and then the xor operation is performed. CFB 
might be represented as yi=xi ⊕ e(yi -1), where yi is the output ciphertext, xi is the input plaintext, e 
is the encryption function and yi -1 is the previous ciphertext. The Initialization Vector has 128-bit 
length and is obtained as the concatenation of two 32-bit SNMPv3 header values (snmpEngineBoots 
and snmpEngineTime) and a local 64-bit integer. 
 
4 NETWORK MANAGEMENT AND DATA CAPTURING SOFTWARES 
 
A number of softwares have been designed to manage data networks. Some of them are free 
while others are not, such as the well-known HP OpenView [12]. This article proposes a NMS 
using only free softwares because of two reasons: they are free of license expenses and permit full 
software technology control. To perform the network management tasks the chosen softwares are 
Nagios and Net-SNMP. To reach the final results proposed in this article some data transmitted 
must be captured and this will be done using Wireshark. 
Nagios [13] is a software designed to monitor network devices and services through external 
plugins (or scripts). There are a lot of plugins available on Internet to ease network administrator's 
job, but Nagios special feature is the possibility to design specific plugins and attach them to 
Nagios. The plugin can be designed in many different programming languages, such as C, C++, 
PERL, Python, Bash, Java or any other script-capable language. 
Net-SNMP [14] is a free combination of the SNMP protocol, SNMP tools and most MIBs 
and is available for Linux, Unix and Microsoft Windows. This software implements the SNMP 
protocol and brings tools for exchanging SNMP data. 
Wireshark [15] is a packet sniffing software. It uses a C library called pcap to capture data 
being transmitted over the bus and permits an easy-to-understand graphical analysis of the captured 
data, such as data transfer time and packet size. Wireshark will be used to collect information to be 
presented in test results. 
 
5 PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION PROPOSAL 
 
The proposal of the performed tests is to verify the performance and therefore the viability 
of four different security configurations of SNMPv3. All tests are done using the authPriv security 
method and the tested configurations are both possible HMAC authentication methods with both 
possible privacy methods. The SNMP configurations tested are 1) HMAC-MD5-96 authentication 
with DES encryption, 2) HMAC-MD5-96 authentication with AES encryption, 3) HMAC-SHA-96 
authentication with DES encryption and 4) HMAC-SHA-96 with AES encryption. 
 The SNMP performance tests performed are not only intended to verify whether better 
encryption causes higher overload, but also to stimulate the use of SNMPv3 with AES encryption if 
possible. Despite the fact that security is a major factor, some manufacturers persist to develop 
equipment with only SNMPv2c implemented, and Broadband Power Line equipments are in this 
situation. 
 A network management system will be implemented and adapted using Nagios in a 
Broadband Power Line pilot project in Goiás, Brazil. All BPL network devices will be managed 
using SNMPv2c, but the results presented in this article may be used as important data if 
manufacturers start designing BPL devices with SNMPv3 support. 
 Broadband Power Line [16][17] is a broadband technology starting to grow especially 
because of its capability to reach geographically difficult places for inexpensive investments. BPL 
transmits data over power transmission lines and can be used for several purposes, such as 
Automatic Meter Reading (AMR), Internet connection, VoIP, LAN. 
 CELG [18] is one of the biggest electrical power transmission companies in Brazil and it 
started in February its pilot project of PLC/BPL Network Management named Practical 
Management Model for Telecommunication Platform Involving PLC Technology. Several PLC 
equipments are being acquired and the network management system is being implemented to 
manage the whole PLC network. 
 Although SNMPv2c performance results are described in this article, it must be emphasized 
that SNMPv2c should not be used, if possible, because of its lack of security. The main idea in the 
article is to verify performance differences among the available security methods implemented in 
the SNMP User Security Model (USM). 
 Three tests are performed in order to track four characteristics: CPU usage, memory usage, 
size of transmitted packets and the transmission rate. The first test is done by monitoring 
characteristics during a Get operation, where the manager host retrieves from a managed host an 
attribute called sysDescr.0. The second test performs a similar operation, but not only one attribute 
value is retrieved, but a lot of them, precisely 207 attribute values. It is done by a sequence of Get 
operations, called walk. The third test performs a Set operation and the SNMP manager host 
changes an attribute called sysContact.0 in the managed host. To obtain a more realistic result, each 
of these three tests is looped for a hundred times and during this loop the memory usage and CPU 
load characteristics are monitored and an average for each test and characteristic is obtained as a 
result. 
 The fourth and final test is performed by monitoring the Nagios server (SNMP manager) 
CPU load during a 15 minutes period for each of the four possible SNMP cryptographic 
configurations while it executes four different Get operations on five hosts. The idea of this test is to 
verify the burden generated on the manager when it has to obtain various information from various 
devices using authentication and cryptography seeking for more realistic practical results. 
 As illustrated in figure 1 the network architecture created for the tests is composed of six 
hosts. Their specifications are shown in table I. 
 
 
Figure 1: Network Architecture. 
 
TABLE I 
Managed Devices Specification. 
 
 OS CPU (MHz) RAM (MB) 
Manager Linux 320 128 
PC1 Windows XP 3000 512 
Sniffer Windows XP 3000 512 
Router Linux 3000 512 
VoD Server Linux 3000 3000 
Sparc1 Linux 320 128 
 
 The SNMP Manager is a SPARC machine running Linux placed in the same network 
(10.0.3.0/255.255.255.0) of PC1 and Sniffer, which are both running Windows XP Professional. 
Sparc1, a SPARC machine running Linux, is placed in a logically separated network 
(192.168.15.0/255.255.255.0). The routing featuring is performed by the Router machine, which is 
also running Linux. 
 Net-SNMP has been installed, configured and initiated in five of the six hosts to allow 
SNMP operations. The Sniffer host was not configured as an SNMP agent. SNMPv2 has been 
configured to use the community name telecom with read and write permissions (otherwise the Set 
operation would not occur successfully). Four SNMPv3 users were configured, each one for a 
possible authentication and privacy combination. Write privilege is assumed to all users. 
 The first test involving performance and data rate was executed between the SNMP 
Manager and Sparc1 using snmpget command (from Net-SNMP package), followed by the second 
test that was performed using the snmpwalk command and the third test that was executed using the 
snmpset command. The management operations were performed between the Manager and Sparc1 
because they are in logically separated networks although connected to the same backbone (router). 
This brings more realistic results considering that many managed devices may be hierarchically 
separated from the Manager, which might generate some latency. Three results are presented in 
tables II, III and IV. 
 Table I presents the Get operation results: 
 
TABLE II 
Get Operation Results. 
 
 SNMPv2c SNMPv3 
 
 MD5 SHA 
  DES AES DES AES 
Frames 2 4 4 4 4 
Delay (ms) 0.75 3.7 3.7 4.1 3.9 
CPU Usage (%) 24 38.1 41.6 47.1 27.2 
Memory Usage (%) 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 
Bytes Transmitted 249 703 703 693 696 
 
 It can be observed from table II that despite the fact that SNMPv2c generates pretty low 
CPU usage, SNMPv3 is a better solution because about 40% CPU usage on a 320MHz host would 
represent about 4% load for current server hosts. Also the packets transmitted are also very small 
because for both DES and AES algorithms the ciphertext block has the same or almost the same 
size of the plaintext block (bitstring completion might be needed). The biggest transmission (sent 
and received) is smaller than 1 kilobyte, which is smaller than most channel Maximum Transfer 
Unit (MTU). The MTU represents the maximum data size the channel can transmit at a time. The 
Ethernet MTU, for instance, is 1540 bytes. 
 
TABLE III 
Walk Operation Results. 
 
 SNMPv2c SNMPv3 
 
 MD5 SHA 
 
 DES AES DES AES 
Frames 416 418 418 418 418 
Delay (s) 0.42 0.70 0.70 0.74 0.73 
CPU Usage (%) 24 54.5 54.3 58.8 57.6 
Memory Usage (%) 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 
Kilo Bytes Transmitted 37 77 78 79 80 
 
 Table III shows that SNMPv3 with AES is, in fact, the best solution. Even for a sequence of 
Get operations, the use of DES and AES generates almost the same CPU usage and data overload. 
One important characteristic to be observed from table III is the transmission delay. If observed the 
difference of transmission delay among SNMP implementations in table II (in percentage) with the 
delay among SNMP implementations in table III it comes clear that the encryption characteristic 
does not generate network overload. The SNMPv3 packets are bigger because of the SNMPv3 
header fields, not the SNMP data itself. Using both privacy algorithms, the ciphertext block is the 
same or almost the same of the plaintext block. 
 Notice that an amount of 207 OID ciphered values has been retrieved in less than one 
second by snmpwalk, which can be considered an excellent performance. 
 Table IV presents Set operation results: 
 
TABLE IV 
Set Operation Results. 
 
 SNMPv2c SNMPv3 
 
 MD5 SHA 
 
 DES AES DES AES 
Frames 2 4 4 4 4 
Delay (ms) 6.6 9.3 9.4 9.6 9.7 
CPU Usage (%) 18.1 38.8 39.8 42 42 
Memory Usage (%) 1.66 1.73 1.74 1.8 1.8 
Bytes Transmitted 182 626 636 624 626 
 
 Table IV presents similar results to the Get operation with lower CPU usage. The SNMPv2c 
reached the best results because it has got no security implemented. The authentication is realized 
by informing a simple string that is transmitted in plain text and the management data is transmitted 
also in plaintext. The SNMPv3 security implementations present similar results when performance 
is considered, but when security is weighted, the use of AES as privacy algorithm is the best option, 
due to DES limited key length. 
 For the fourth test Nagios has been configured to perform Get operations on hosts Sparc1, 
Router, VoD, PC1 and itself. For each managed host it was decided to retrieve four OIDs values: 
tcpInErr.0, snmpInErrors.0, snmpOutErrors.0 and ifInErrors.0. But Nagios cannot manage devices 
using SNMP by itself. To realize SNMP tasks it is necessary to download or create Nagios external 
plugins. A few plugins are available in [19], which is the official Nagios plugins repository, but the 
SNMP available plugins were designed to search for specific information (attributes) or only to 
perform DES cryptography. Since Nagios is a software designed initially to manage computer 
networks only, the SNMP plugins are normally designed to manage computers or computer 
network equipments such as routers. 
 This article also proposes a NMS capable of managing IP-based networks using Nagios, 
therefore a generic Nagios SNMP plugin with AES support was designed. It is a shell script that 
runs the snmpget command (included in Net-SNMP software) on any SNMP agent retrieving any 
SNMP object value. The script also receives limiting values to judge if the obtained value is in 
normal, warning or critical condition. This plugin is ideal for a generic SNMP network management 
because it does not depend on the network technology. Some OIDs are specific for computer 
network equipments, while others are specific for BPL equipments such as signal-noise relation, so 
it is only necessary to specify the desired OID to be retrieved. Also the plugin allow the 
administrator to inform which SNMP version and which privacy algorithm (if needed) Nagios must 
use to perform the Get operation. Although SNMPv3 should be used, some devices do not have the 
third version of SNMP implemented yet, therefore the plugin can be configured to use SNMPv2c. 
 The generic SNMP plugin must receive some parameters. If the SNMP version to be used is 
v2c then it must receive a community name. If the SNMP version to be used is v3 then the 
administrator must pass six additional parameters: the security model (noAuthNoPriv, authNoPriv 
or authPriv), the authentication user, the authentication method (MD5 or SHA), the authentication 
password, the privacy algorithm (DES or AES) and the privacy password. The privacy password is 
used by DES to generate the Initialization Vector. For both SNMP versions two other parameters 
are required, the hostname or IP address of the device to be managed and the OID to be consulted. 
 For instance, if the desired object to be retrieved is tcpInErrs.0, which represents how many 
erroneous TCP segments the managed device has received, the command /path/snmp.sh -v 3 -l 
authPriv -u secure –a SHA -A password -x AES -X password -H 10.0.3.1 -o tcpInErrs.0 -W 10 -C 
20$ must be used. In this case the command represents SNMP version 3, security model authPriv, 
secure as user, SHA as authentication method, password as the authentication password, AES as the 
encryption algorithm, password as the privacy password, 10.0.3.1 as the host to be managed, 
tcpInErrs.0 as the target OID, 10 as the default value, between 10 and 20 as a warning value and 
above 20 as a critical value, respectively. The command response could be "OK - Normal Value: 
0", "WARNING - Value above expected: 15" or "CRITICAL - Very High Value: 30". 
 Nagios was configured to perform 20 Get operations (4 gets on each agent) per minute 
during 15 minutes. All four cryptographic configurations have been monitored for fifteen minutes, 
but only the first minute is graphically represented. First configuration was using SNMPv2c, 
followed by SNMPv3 with MD5 authentication and DES encryption, SNMPv3 with MD5 
authentication and AES encryption, SNMPv3 with SHA authentication and DES encryption and 
SNMPv3 with SHA authentication and AES encryption. The graphical representation of the CPU 
usage results is illustrated in figure 2. Also the HMAC-MD5 authentication is not presented because 
SHA is recommended to be used for security reason and the results show that MD5 brings no 
performance improvement over SHA. Basically the graphic represents a comparison of CPU usage 
among SNMPv2c, SNMPv3 HMAC-SHA-96 authentication with DES encryption and SNMPv3 
HMAC-SHA-96 authentication with AES encryption. 
 























Figure 2: CPU Usage. 
 
 The CPU usage increased if compared to the SNMP operation tables. This increasing was 
caused by Nagios. But the important information to extract from figure 2 is that DES and AES 
cause the same impact on CPU load. During the SNMP generic plugin execution, another script was 
running to capture packets sent and received by the manager to generate a graphical representation 
of network load, which is represented in figure 3. 



























Figure 3: Network Load. 
 
 As it can be observed in Figure 3, using SNMPv3 with AES is the best solution because 
AES does not cause network traffic. The generated network traffic is due to the SNMPv3 header. 
Based on theoretical issues and on tests results, it is strongly recommended to use SNMP version 3 
in combination with AES encryption, if possible. Most network devices bring SNMP support, but it 
is common to find these devices with SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c support only. Most recent designed 
devices bring SNMPv3 support, but still, most of them support DES encryption. Probably due to the 
fact that SNMP AES support is a relatively recent standard, manufacturers are only now starting to 
design devices with SNMP/AES support, but it is not a commonly spread practice. Most recently 
designed routers and switches bring this possibility, but in the BPL area it does not happen. It is 




 The advance of data transmission technology generates a great deal of complexity, 
considering the coexistence of heterogeneous devices from different technologies and different 
manufacturers. This complexity must be properly managed otherwise outages, leakages, errors and 
security breaches might probably come up. 
 In order to manage data networks a number of network management softwares have been 
designed based on the SNMP protocol. Despite the effort of the Internet Working Group to keep 
improving SNMP, administrators and manufacturers continue to implement and configure network 
management systems based on the second version of this protocol, which has critical security flaws. 
 The tests presented in this paper show that the use of SNMP version 3 with security 
characteristics such as authentication and privacy, specially using AES encryption, turns to be a 
great option and must be encouraged because some very important and critical information may be 
transmitted, and it cannot occur in plaintext. Also, the load generated on the network is meaningless 
and the CPU load caused by encryption is too little for current processing units capability since the 
only arithmetic operation performed is the XOR operation. 
 The tests show that some CPU usage peaks happen, but it must be noticed that the Manager 
host is an old UltraSparcII with 320 MHz clock and 128 MB of RAM, a pretty out-of-date machine 
when compared to actual servers solutions with dual/quadruple processing. 
 From the results obtained it comes clear that managing a complex data network with free 
softwares and the SNMP protocol does not generate network overload. The network usage during 
SNMP operations, despite the possibility to manage several network elements and several OIDs 
concurrently, is very low. Each SNMP Get operation generates a data flow of approximately 700 
bytes, which is less than most MTU channels, therefore no fragmentation is necessary. 
 For CELG pilot project of BPL network management, these results demonstrate that once 
the access to MIB devices are reached, the presented NMS using the developed plugin will ease the 
management of the heterogeneous devices, since equipments from different manufacturers with 
different SNMP implementations will coexist. This paper also presents a perspective of how the 
BPL network will be impacted if future BPL devices bring SNMPv3 support. 
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